

Background to discussion on FCA and Nordic market design

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Vivi Mathiesen, Head of section Electricity wholesale market

Background

- Target model => Framework Guideline for Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management (CACM)
 - Commission guideline CACM
 - Network Code Forward Capacity Allocation (FCA)
- The goal for FCA is to ensure availability of hedging opportunities for market participants...
- Stakeholder views are important!

Network Codes – Rules for the TSOs


- Network Code on Forward Capacity Allocation (FCA)
- An anomaly in the 'Nordic market design' because...
 - All capacity is allocated to the spot market
 - The Nordic TSO do not have a role in the forward market
 - The Nordic market for hedging is regulated by the Financial Supervisory Authority
- Is it possible to enable efficient hedging without the TSO having a role?

The Nordic case

- Strong interlinkage between a robust physical market (>80% traded in the spot market)
- …an efficient price finding
- the System price as a robust reference price
- ...and a liquid market for financial hedging instruments
- …and efficient hedging




Key figures – Physical market % spot trade of total consumtion




Source: Nord Pool Spot

Key figures – Financial market Cleared volume

Cleared volumes Nordic Power Yearly 2005-2015 (TWh)



Liquidity. Efficiency. Trust.



15 bidding zones – one system price

- Cross border competition is ensured by implicit market coupling
- Market participants face price area risk



Hedging on hubs vs. hedging by Transmission rights


Hedging on hubs

- Financial instruments
 - System price products
 - Highly liquid
 - Contracts for area price difference (EPADs)
- Can also be constructed as 'cross border'

Hedging from 'A to B'

- Transmission rights
 - Cross border
 - Linked to capacity on interconnector
 - 'Liquidity' backed by TSO

Hedging on hubs vs. hedging by Transmission rights



Nordic regulators' goal

- Ensure sufficient hedging opportunities for market participants!
- Enable optionality in possible instruments for hedging
- Don't make TR mandatory

EU Regulation for cross border trade

- EC 714/2009 Annex 1, pt 2.8:
 - In regions where forward financial electricity markets are well developed and have shown their efficiency, all interconnection capacity may be allocated through implicit auctioning.

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 - In regions where forward financial electricity markets are well developed and have shown their efficiency, all interconnection capacity may be allocated through implicit auctioning.
 - ...whereas Nordic NRAs wanted discretion to decide,
 - EC wanted specific and objective criteria...

What is an efficient market?

- Efficiency test in two steps:
 - Relevant hedging opportunities
 - (based on IAS39)
 - Efficiency of relevant hedging opportuinities
 - (based on actual spread vs. implicit spread)

New draft FCA from the Commission

- Opens up for other heding instruments
- TSO involvement?
- Removes specific reference to IAS 39

Thank you for your attention!


Robust principles for asessment I

- Not a specialised 'Nordic electricity market test', but
- Based on international accounting standard and common auditing practice
 - Hedged item
 - Hedging instrument
 - Hedge effectiveness

Linear regression model to test prospective efficiency




Example of test (DK1-PHELIX)



Slope a = 0,96, Constraint 1 ok (>=0,8 and <=1,25) R2 = 0,63, Constraint 2 not ok (>=0,8) The regression test on Day Ahead Prices between DK2 and PHELIX fails.

Robust principles for asessment II

"A Simple Implicit Measure of the Effective Bid-Ask Spread in an Efficient Market" in *The Journal of Finance*, Vol. XXXIX. NO. 4, September 1984




Source: Nasdaq OMX

Key figures – Physical market

Key figures Key Back Spot trade: 92% of total consumption in 2014 (87% in 2013)

TWh



21

